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POLICING FEDERAL PROSECUTORS: DO TOO
MANY REGULATORS PRODUCE TOO LITTLE
ENFORCEMENT?*
BRUCE A. GREEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Because this symposium is dedicated to examining issues of pro-
fessionalism partly from the perspective of power and the public inter-
est, it seems appropriate to look at the professional conduct of criminal
prosecutors. In discussions of prosecutorial conduct, issues of power
and the public interest inevitably converge. That is because prosecutors
wield "immense power to strike at citizens"' and do so not in pursuit
of private gain, but charged with the responsibility to "seek justice."2
In light of prosecutors' immense power and public-interested role,
they assume professional obligations that are, in the very least, different
from those assumed by other lawyers, if not, as some have described
them, "special"3 and "extraordinary."4 At the same time, public confi-
dence in criminal law enforcement demands that prosecutors live up to
these high standards. As Chief Justice Warren observed in a decision
dealing with unconstitutional investigative measures, "the police must
obey the law while enforcing the law."5 The same is certainly true of
prosecutors.
Commentators have often observed, however, that many prosecu-
tors fail to meet the professional standards that govern their conduct,6
* Copyright © 1995 by Bruce A. Green.
** Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Stein Center for
Ethics and Public Interest Law. I am grateful to Russell Pearce and Daniel Richman for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3
(1940).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981). "The responsibility
of the public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not
merely to convict." Id. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?. 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1983) (entitled "Special Re-
sponsibilities of a Prosecutor").
4. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.2, at 760 (1986).
5. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
6. See. e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of Prosecuting Attor-
neys, 88 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1034-42 (1967); Joseph F. Lawless & Kenneth E. North, Prosecuto-
rial Misconduct, TRIAL, Oct. 1984, at 26; Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 708-16 (1987). For
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and that the mechanism for policing the ethical conduct of prosecutors
deals with this problem ineffectively.7 The inadequacy of formal disci-
plinary processes, they argue, is illustrated by the dearth of publicly
reported instances in which prosecutors, and especially federal prosecu-
tors, have been disciplined.8 This perceived failure of disciplinary au-
thorities has been explained in various ways. For example, commenta-
tors have suggested that some members of the judiciary who are former
prosecutors may be inordinately hostile to claims of prosecutorial mis-
conduct;9 that evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, particularly in
federal cases, may be difficult to obtain;'0 and that members of disci-
plinary bodies generally lack experience in criminal cases and may
therefore be reluctant to judge the conduct of prosecutors."
Elsewhere, I have argued that critics exaggerate the prevalence
and seriousness of prosecutorial misconduct. 2 I would now argue fur-
ther that the criticism of formal disciplinary mechanisms overlooks the
importance of informal judicial controls, if not informal professional
controls,' 3 to ensure compliance with standards of prosecutorial con-
articles focusing particularly on the prevalence of misconduct by prosecutors in the courtroom,
such as the use of inadmissible or false evidence, or the use of improper arguments on sum-
mation, see Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
TEX. L. REv. 629, 633-42 (1972); Bennett L. Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22
CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 135-138 (1986) (discussing courtroom misconduct by prosecutors that is
designed to divert the jury from properly deciding a criminal case on the basis of legally ad-
mitted evidence); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38
SW. L.J. 965, 971-72 (1984); Note, The Nature and Function of Forensic Misconduct in the
Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 946, 950, 956-57 (1954).
Courts have also occasionally noted the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g.,
United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 862 (10th Cir.) ("There has over a substantial period
of time, nearly since I have been here, but at least with the present administration of the Unit-
ed States Attorney's office [been] a pattern of conduct or misconduct of not presenting evi-
dence until very late, many times during the trial."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 6, at 670-73; Gershman, supra note 6, at 141-42;
Rosen, supra note 6, at 703 & n.56; Steele, supra note 6, at 976-79; Zacharias, supra note 2,
at 49. But see Richard L. Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response, 55 GEO. L.J. 1048,
1056 (1967) (arguing that scrutiny by trial courts, appellate courts and defense attorneys is ef-
fective to police prosecutors).
8. Disciplinary decisions cited in commentary on prosecutorial misconduct almost invari-
ably involve state and local prosecutors rather than federal prosecutors. See, e.g., Rosen, supra
note 6; Steele, supra note 6; Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against
Attorney for Misconduct Related to Official Duties as Prosecuting Attorney, 10 A.L.R. 4th 605
(1981).
9. Lawless & North, supra note 6, at 27-28.
10. Id. at 28 (evidence of misconduct contained in federal grand jury transcripts may not
be disclosed to the defense absent a threshold factual showing of misconduct).
11. Steele, supra note 6, at 982.
12. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L.
BULL. 126 (1988).
13. Criticism by members of the private bar is unlikely to affect prosecutors' conduct. Nor
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duct. The power of a court to "discipline" a prosecutor for misconduct
that comes to its attention by issuing unfavorable scheduling and dis-
covery orders and evidentiary rulings is not to be underestimated. In-
deed, some might argue that, in deference to judicial authority, prose-
cutors are more apt to be underzealous than overzealous. Of equal
importance is the judge's ability to call misconduct to the attention of
a prosecutor's supervisors and to seek assurances from them that appro-
priate measures will be taken. Because a prosecutor's office, as an
institution, appears repeatedly before the court, it has a greater incen-
tive than other law offices to respond appropriately to such requests.
Nevertheless, it is important that formal disciplinary mechanisms
be available to respond effectively to prosecutorial misconduct. To be
effective, a disciplinary mechanism must establish a standard of proper
conduct, then identify and sanction those individuals whose conduct
deviates from that standard. When it comes to regulating and disciplin-
ing attorneys, there is invariably some tension between how disciplinary
authorities and the lawyers they govern construe the limits on proper
conduct. This is true even though lawyers, through the American Bar
Association and state and local bar associations, play the leading role
in fashioning the rules courts apply to lawyers' professional conduct.
To the public it may appear that those who are being regulated and
those who are doing the regulating are the same-namely, lawyers. But
in truth the legal profession is comprised of various groups with diver-
gent interests; a differing view of what is ethical conduct may be taken
by the civil plaintiffs' bar as opposed to the civil defense bar, by prac-
titioners in large law firms as opposed to sole practitioners, by trial
lawyers as opposed to corporate lawyers, or by state litigators as op-
posed to federal litigators. 14 The interests and experiences of prosecu-
tors are in many respects unique and, as a consequence, prosecutors
frequently view the propriety of their own behavior differently from
others within the organized bar including, but not limited to, criminal
defense attorneys. Therefore, it is important that authoritative rulings be
is the marketplace likely to be effective in discouraging the types of misconduct with which
commentators are typically concerned-e.g., overzealousness in jury arguments or the failure to
disclose discoverable information. It is true that many, if not most, prosecutors plan eventually
to leave the government. But concern about offending future employers or colleagues is unlike-
ly to discourage prosecutorial excesses. As likely as not, future employers will view some
measure of excess as evidence of zealousness or aggressiveness that is valued in the private
bar.
14. See generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468
(1990).
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issued regarding the scope of proper prosecutorial conduct and that
improper conduct be sanctioned.
This Article focuses on how standards of prosecutorial conduct are
enforced. As will be discussed, the process for sanctioning wrongful
conduct of federal prosecutors is structurally inadequate. Federal prose-
cutors are subject to discipline by as many as four different authorities.
Yet, each of the available disciplinary mechanisms is itself deficient.
Furthermore, the diffusion of responsibility among different mechanisms
compounds the problem.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS GOVERNING
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Prosecutorial conduct is governed in large part by statutory and
constitutional law. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,15 federal statutes, 6 and the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution 7 each impose discovery obligations on federal
prosecutors. Similarly, a federal regulation, 8  federal statutes, 9 and
various constitutional provisions" regulate prosecutors and their agents
in seeking statements from witnesses, suspects and defendants.
Broadly speaking, there are three additional sources of law gov-
erning the conduct of federal prosecutors. These are: (1) codes of pro-
fessional responsibility and other rules adopted by federal district courts
pursuant to their rule-making authority, (2) rules promulgated by feder-
al courts on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, and (3) internal guidelines
adopted by the Department of Justice. An overview of these additional
sources of law is undertaken here as background to this Article's exam-
ination of the regulatory bodies responsible for overseeing federal
prosecutors' conduct.
15. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
17. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565 (1995) (prosecutor's failure to
disclose evidence favorable to the defense in a capital murder case violated due process); Unit-
ed States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1963)
(establishing prosecution's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused); United States v.
Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 1995); see generally Tom Stacy, The Search for the
Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1369 (1991); Daniel J. Capra,
Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and
Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391 (1984).
18. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995) (regulating communications with represented persons).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994) (regulating wiretapping).
20. Arizona v. Fulminane, 499 U.S. 279, 311 (1991) (Due Process Clause); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
[Vol. 8
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A. CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Lawyers customarily look to the codified standards of professional
responsibility applicable in the relevant jurisdiction to determine their
ethical obligations. In almost every state, the highest court has adopted
standards governing lawyers' conduct. In most instances, these courts
have relied on rules drafted by the American Bar Association
(ABA)-either the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code), which was initially adopted by the ABA in 1969, or the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which was adopted by
the ABA in 1983.2 Once adopted by the state court, the rules gener-
ally govern lawyers Who are admitted to practice in the particular state
or who appear before a court of that state.22
Like the state courts, federal courts, pursuant to their rule-making
authority, have adopted rules governing the conduct of attorneys who
appear before them.-3 In some cases, district courts have promulgated
individual rules.2'  But, for the most part, they have simply adopted
local rules that incorporate by reference either the ABA Model Code,
the ABA Model Rules, or the standards adopted by the high court of
the state.2' Federal prosecutors, like other lawyers practicing before a
21. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36
REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 77 (1981); WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 48-65; Marjorie E. Gross,
The Long Process of Change: The 1990 Amendments to the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility, 18 FORD. URB. LJ. 283 (1991).
22. A problem might arise, however, if there were a conflict between the ethical rules of
the state before which the lawyer is appearing and the state in which he is licensed to prac-
tice. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994).
23. The federal courts' authority to adopt ethical rules governing federal prosecutors has a
variety of sources. To begin with, federal courts have broad common law authority to supervise
and discipline lawyers who appear before them that derives primarily from their authority to
admit, suspend and disbar attorneys who practice within the jurisdiction. Bruce A. Green, Doe
v. Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 530-
31 & nn.161-62 (1989). In addition, federal courts have general supervisory authority over the
conduct of criminal proceedings. See. e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). See
generally Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984);
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pit. L. REv. 393 (1992). The extent of
the federal courts' supervisory authority over federal prosecutors has increasingly been called
into question, however, particularly with respect to conduct outside the courtroom. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he federal judiciary's
supervisory powers over prosecutorial activities that take place outside the courthouse is ex-
tremely limited, if it exists at all."). See generally Gershman, supra, at 433-43.
24. For example, some district courts have adopted restraints on extrajudicial speech in
criminal cases. See, e.g., DIST. CONN. Loc. CRIM. R. 7; E. & S. DIST. N.Y. LOC. CRIM. R.
13.
25. See, e.g., Stamp v. Brown, No. 81-C1475, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2086, at *3 (N.D.
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federal district court, are subject to professional standards incorporated
in district court rules, as interpreted by federal courts of the district.26
When interpreting the ethical rules in the context of decisions in disci-
plinary proceedings, rulings on disqualification motions, or other deter-
minations, the federal courts are not bound by state judicial interpreta-
tions. That is because, as federal courts often note, the ethical rules
applicable in federal judicial proceedings are a matter of federal law
and state ethical rules cannot, of their own force, be the basis for judi-
cial rulings in federal proceedings.27
In some cases, rules have been promulgated by bar associations
but not generally adopted by any judicial authority. The only important
example, as far as federal prosecutors are concerned, is the ABA Stan-
dards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecu-
tion Function.28 Although portions of these standards have been adopt-
ed by at least one jurisdiction to provide an additional basis of attorney
discipline,29 in most jurisdictions they have not been adopted on a
wholesale basis. They have, however, often been invoked by the courts
when interpreting other law or when formulating rulings on an ad hoc
basis.3"
I11. Feb. 27, 1990) (citing N.D. ILL. Loc. CT. R. 3.54(b) stating that attorneys may be disci-
plined for violating the Model Code of Professional Responsibility). See also Polycast Tech.
Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that an attorney may be
disciplined for "conduct violative of the Codes of Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association or the New York Bar Association from time to time in force.").
26. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349,
1355 (Ist Cir. 1995).
27. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985); Grievance Comm. for S. Dist.
N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995).
28. See Robert G. Morvillo, Forfeiture of Legal Fees, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2, 1991, at 6.
The Prosecution Function Standards comprise one chapter of a four-volume book,
ABA Standards of Criminal Justice. The standards are not limited to ethical matters
but include recommendations and guidelines on, for instance, the training of prose-
cutors and office administration and organization. The ABA describes the Prosecution
Standards as "hortatory standards," and unlike the Model Rules, not meant to be
binding, but intended to serve rather as standards worthy of aspiration. While the
standards may, of course, be adopted as ethical rules, local rules or statutes, they are
adopted with the intent that they serve as guidelines. It is unclear as to how many
of the standards have actually been adopted in a binding fashion. However, the stan-
dards are referred to in court decisions involving disciplinary and ethical problems as
persuasive.
Id.
Another independent body of ethics rules with potential application to federal prosecutors
is the Federal Ethical Considerations promulgated by the Federal Bar Association in 1973. See
C. Normand Poirer, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional Ethics, 60 A.B.A. J.
1541 (1974). However, these ethical rules have rarely been invoked in judicial decisions and
add little to the lawyers' codes that have been adopted by the courts.
29. See MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:08.
30. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 191 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
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B. AD Hoc JUDICIAL RULES
Federal prosecutors are also subject to ethical rules announced by
federal courts on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis pursuant to each court's
supervisory authority.3' Typically, the conduct is not clearly proscribed
by constitutional or statutory law or by prevailing professional stan-
dards, but is nonetheless deemed wrongful given the prosecutor's duty
to "seek justice." For example, courts have directed prosecutors to
make disclosure to the court or take other remedial steps when prose-
cutors are aware that the defendant's counsel has a conflict of inter-
est.32 Federal court opinions have set limits on the issuance of subpoe-
nas to defense attorneys.33 Other opinions requiring federal prosecutors
to uphold a higher level of candor have forbidden prosecutors from
misleading grand jury witnesses and others about their status as the
subject or target of a criminal investigation,34 recognized a prosecuto-
rial responsibility to correct errors in a pre-sentence investigation re-
port,35 and enjoined prosecutors from making erroneous legal argu-
ments to justify the admission of evidence.36
In virtually all cases, the federal courts' ad hoc rules have been
announced in the context of opinions criticizing the prosecutor's con-
duct in a given case; in many instances, the expected standard of con-
duct is left somewhat vague. While the court may make plain that the
Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 354 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927,
934 n.l (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988); United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34, 43
(2d Cir. 1984); cf Jeffries v. Blodgett, 988 F.2d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 1993) ("the ABA Stan-
dards serve only as a 'guide' . . . .").
31. See, e.g., United States v. Gurney, 393 F. Supp. 683 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States
v. Thomas, 320 F. Supp. 527 (D.D.C. 1970).
32. See. e.g., Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 583-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
908 (1988); United States v. lorizzo, 786 F.2d 52. 59 (2d Cir. 1986). See generally Bruce A.
Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a
Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323 (1989).
33. United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1348-50 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that while a
defendant awaits trial, it is wrongful for a prosecutor to issue a grand jury subpoena to the
indicted defendant's attorney to obtain evidence relating to the defendant for use against oth-
ers).
34. United States v. Babb, 807 F.2d 272, 276-77 (lst Cir. 1986) (holding that a prosecu-
tor may not affirmatively deceive a grand jury witness about his or her status as a target or
subject of the investigation); United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979) (ruling that a prosecutor acted improperly in failing to dis-
close that a criminal investigation had been initiated against the lawyer's client); United States
v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 773-75 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that a prosecutor must disclose that a
grand jury witness is a target).
35. United States v. Jones, 983 F.2d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir. 1993).
36. United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 735-37 (l1th Cir. 1990).
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prosecutor transgressed a norm, it may not spell out that norm precise-
ly in its opinion, nor is it likely to codify the norm thereafter. Thus, to
a large degree, federal prosecutors are expected to be familiar with the
decisional law relevant to their conduct and to extract applicable stan-
dards of conduct from critical opinions.
C. INTERNAL GUIDELINES
Like other prosecuting authorities, the United States Department of
Justice (Department) may promulgate specific regulations governing the
conduct of prosecutors.37 The Department has done so in two ways.
First, like some federal courts, the Department has incorporated the
ABA Model Code by reference in its guidelines. 8 Second, the Depart-
ment has developed its own guidelines to assist federal prosecutors in
the performance of their duties and to set uniform policy on certain
matters.
Some of the guidelines are designed to supplement provisions of
the professional codes that address the same issue. For example, the
Department has issued a guideline governing prosecutors' communica-
tions with the media in connection with pending cases.39 This guide-
line augments restrictions of DR 7-107 of the ABA Model Code, Rule
3.6 of the ABA Model Rules, as well as some local rules of the feder-
al district courts.4"
Other guidelines have been adopted in part to discourage the
adoption or enforcement of competing provisions of the professional
codes. For example, the Department has promulgated guidelines for the
issuance of grand jury subpoenas to defense attorneys.4 It did so as
part of an effort to discourage courts from adopting a recent amend-
ment to the Model Rules dealing with this subject. The Department can
now point to this guideline to support its argument that judicial regula-
tion in this area is unnecessary.
37. Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 507, 517-24 (1976); see also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecuto-
rial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562-66 (1981). See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, DIS-
CRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
38. 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1995) ("[A]ttomeys employed by the Department should be
guided in their conduct by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Asso-
ciation."). The provision was not updated following the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules in
1983.
39. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1995).
40. Stamp, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2086 at *3; Polycast, 129 F.R.D at 624.
41. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.161(a) (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter DOJ MANU-
[Vol. 8
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For the most part, however, the Department's guidelines deal with
issues that are not meaningfully addressed by the professional codes.
This is true, for example, of guidelines dealing with the issuance of
subpoenas to members of the media,42 the consensual monitoring of
oral and wire communications,43 the non-consensual interception of
wire or oral communications through eavesdropping or wiretapping,44
dual and successive prosecutions when the defendant has been or is
already being prosecuted in a state court,45 and warnings to grand jury
witnesses.46
The Department's guidelines generally do not create substantive
rights for the defendant.47 In fact, many of the Justice Department
regulations expressly state that they are intended only for internal guid-
ance and should not be used to create any enforceable rights for defen-
dants.4' Thus, a violation of a Justice Department guideline would not
entitle a defendant to dismissal of an indictment or quashing of a sub-
poena.49 Violation of these policies could, however, serve as a basis
for disciplining a federal prosecutor."
III. THE MECHANISMS FOR DISCIPLINING FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS
Criminal defense lawyers often accuse prosecutors of wrongful
behavior. Whether or not there is any basis to it, such an accusation
may be useful as part of a criminal defense.5 Or, it may help the de-
fendant obtain some procedural advantage. For example, accusations of
42. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1995).
43. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 41, § 9-7.302.
44. Id. §§ 9-7.110 to -7.180.
45. Id. § 9-2.142.
46. Id. § 9-11.153.
47. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-57 (1979); United States v.
Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 682-83 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 635 (7th Cir.
1985).
48. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 41, § 9-2.161(a) (outlining attorney subpoena guidelines); 28
C.F.R. § 50.10 (1995) (providing guidelines for subpoenas to the press).
49. Klein, 776 F.2d at 635. But see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974)
(holding that suppression of evidence obtained through a wiretap that was not properly autho-
rized by a deputy attorney general was proper where "re-application approval was intended to
play a central role in the statutory scheme").
50. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n) (1995); United States v. Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 311 (1st
Cir. 1989) (referring prosecutor's violation of target warning guideline to DOJ Office of Pro-
fessional Responsibility).
51. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE at xiv (1982) ("In representing critlinal
defendants-especially guilty ones-it is often necessary to take the offensive against the gov-
ernment: to put the government on trial for its misconduct.") (emphasis added).
1995]
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wrongdoing may discredit prosecutors in the court's eyes, distract pros-
ecutors, cause prosecutors to expend resources to defend themselves, or
cast the defendant's evidentiary claim or other legal claim in a more
sympathetic light.
Formal accusations of prosecutorial misconduct are far more rare.
When filing a formal accusation, the defense lawyer's purpose is gener-
ally not to punish the prosecutor personally, but to obtain some relief
for the defendant. For example, defense counsel may move to dismiss
an indictment based on alleged improprieties in the grand jury, to sup-
press evidence thought to have been obtained by unethical means, or to
overturn a conviction that purportedly was secured through improper
behavior at trial.
While providing procedural relief to the defendant as a remedy for
prosecutorial misconduct might be viewed as a personal rebuke to the
prosecutor and might discourage similar misconduct in the future,52 it
is unusual for federal courts to provide such relief.53 Nor, as a general
52. Several appellate courts have expressed frustration that the harmless error rule has
caused their warnings about prosecutorial misconduct to go unheeded because the convictions
were ultimately affirmed. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (2d Cir.
1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
53. See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 48 n.13. Because of the availability of disciplinary
sanctions against prosecutors, courts generally recognize that dismissing an indictment or over-
turning a conviction-remedies which punish society more than the prosecutor-are inappropri-
ate simply as a device for deterring future misconduct. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. Unit-
ed States, 487 U.S 250, 263 (1988); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983);
Peveto, 881 F.2d at 844, 862-63; United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519 (Former 5th Cir.
1983); Modica, 663 F.2d at 1173; Gershman, supra note 6. To overturn a conviction, a de-
fendant must generally demonstrate that the prosecutor's actions violated a constitutional provi-
sion, a statute, or a rule of criminal procedure, and not just an ethical rule. In the past, feder-
al courts occasionally overturned convictions on the basis of prosecutorial conduct that was
unethical, but violated no particular provision of federal law. See, e.g.. United States v. Jacobs,
547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Beale, supra note 23, at 1433. But see United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the court's authority to
overturn decisions based on prosecutorial misconduct has increasingly come into question, and
federal courts in recent years have been hesitant to test their authority).
In addition, to overturn a conviction a criminal defendant must generally show that the
prosecutor's misconduct was not harmless. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); Bank of Nova Scotia,
487 U.S. at 254-56 (holding that a district court generally exceeds its supervisory authority in
dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct that does not prejudice the defendant).
The application of the "harmless error rule" results in many cases where convictions are af-
firmed even though the prosecutor has acted wrongfully. See United States v. Mechanik, 475
U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (holding that a defendant may not appeal from a conviction based on
claims of misconduct in the grand jury, since a conviction by a petit jury demonstrates that
any error in the grand jury was harmless); Modica, 663 F.2d at 1173 (vouching for witness's
credibility during summation); People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979) (question-
ing Jefendant without notifying defense counsel); State v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Or.
198 ) (instructing prospective witnesses not to talk to defense counsel); State v. Hohman, 420
A.2o 852, 854 (Vt. 1980) (improper pretrial publicity); Erica M. Landsburg, Note, Policing
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rule, is there a civil remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.54 Except on
the rare occasions when a remedy for the defendant is available under
the law, defense lawyers will have little incentive to formally challenge
the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct.5
Although of little benefit to aggrieved defendants, personal sanc-
tions may be imposed on federal prosecutors who engage in miscon-
duct. Indeed, federal courts view personal sanctions as the most appro-
priate response. Thus, in determining that it was improper to reverse a
criminal conviction in order to deter prosecutorial misconduct, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Hasting56 cited the availability of per-
sonal sanctions which were "more narrowly tailored."57 Courts have
also relied on the possibility of personal sanctions to justify the general
unavailability of a civil remedy for prosecutorial misconduct,58 as well
as to support the unavailability of monetary sanctions against the
prosecutor's office.59
Four bodies have some authority to sanction a prosecutor for
misconduct in a federal criminal proceeding: the federal district court
presiding over the proceeding, a disciplinary committee of the federal
court, the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility,
and a disciplinary committee established in the state in which the pros-
ecutor is licensed. This next section discusses the limitations of each of
Attorneys: Exclusion of Unethically Obtained Evidence, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399 (1986).
54. A criminal defendant generally may not pursue an independent civil suit against a
prosecutor for violating his civil rights by unethical behavior because prosecutors have absolute
immunity for misconduct related to their prosecutorial function. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 431 (1976), affg 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Susan M. Coyne, Note, Immu-
nizing the Investigating Prosecutor: Should the Dishonest Go Free or the Honest Defend, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 1110, 1112-14 (1980); John L. Filosa, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: No
Place for Absolutes, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 977 (1983); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding prosecutor has only qualified immunity for conduct in investigative capacity).
55. Green, 274 N.W.2d at 468; Rosen, supra note 6, at 734-35; Steele, supra note 6, at
980. Perhaps the most extreme reaction to an accusation of prosecutorial misconduct is the libel
suit recently filed by a federal prosecutor against a criminal defense lawyer who filed a com-
plaint with the Department of Justice. See Gary Taylor, Prosecutor's Lawsuit Rules Defense
Bar, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at A5; Lawyer's Complaint to DOJ Draws Libel Suit from
AUSA, Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) No. 9, at 202 (Apr. 26, 1995). However, the principal
disincentive to filing a formal complaint with a court or disciplinary body is the cost to future
clients who may seek leniency from the prosecutor's office.
56. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
57. Id. at 506 & n.5.
58. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
59. See United States v. Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Hom, 29 F.3d 754, 766-67 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Prince, CR 93-1073(RR),
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2962, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1994) (publicly reprimanding United
States Attorney's Office for discovery violations, but withdrawing assessment of jury costs).
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these disciplinary mechanisms in enforcing standards of prosecutorial
conduct.
A. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Federal prosecutors appear regularly before the judges of the dis-
tricts in which they practice. As a result, the propriety of their conduct
comes under judicial scrutiny more often than that of other attorneys."
Such close judicial observation may itself discourage prosecutors from
engaging in certain types of misconduct.6 When it does not, district
judges have authority to discipline federal prosecutors in a number of
ways.
In cases involving certain types of serious, willful misconduct by
a lawyer practicing before the federal court, the court may impose a
criminal sanction: it may punish the lawyer for contempt of court.6"
The imposition of contempt sanctions is limited, however, to certain
types of misconduct-generally, willful disobedience of a court order or
contemptuous or contumacious conduct in court that threatens the ad-
ministration of justice. 3 The contempt sanction may be imposed sum-
marily when the misconduct occurs in the judge's presence; otherwise,
a hearing must be conducted.' In actual practice judges rarely, if ev-
er, invoke this drastic remedy against federal prosecutors,6" although
60. Lee A. Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors and Federal Courts: Some Recent
Problems, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 756-57 (1978).
No aspect of the job of a federal prosecutor has escaped judicial attention: The
interviewing of witnesses, conduct of proceedings before the grand jury, application
for arrest and search warrants, statements made in court and during trial. statements
made to the press, giving of information to or withholding of information from the
defendants attorney, the wording of indictments, as well as the making of agreements
with witnesses and defendants.
Id. at 755-56 (footnotes omitted).
61. Braun, supra note 7, at 1055-57. For discussions of prosecutorial misconduct that may
escape judicial scrutiny, see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23
CRIM. L. BULL. 550 (1987) and Green, supra note 12.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Giovanelli, 897 F.2d 1227, 1230 (2d Cir.) (upholding sum-
mary contempt conviction of criminal defense attorney who addressed judge defiantly in jury's
presence), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 (1990).
63. Giovanelli, 897 F.2d at 1229.
64. Id. at 1230.
65. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 673-74 (no cases found in which a prosecutor has been
held in contempt for courtroom misconduct); Gershman, supra note 6, at 141; Lawless &
North, supra note 6, at 26; Steele, supra note 6, at 703 n.56 (no cases found in which a
prosecutor has been held in contempt for violating his discovery obligations); WOLFRAM, supra
note 4, at 761 & n.44.
The contempt sanction has been applied, however, to state prosecutors. See, e.g.,
Brostoff v. Berkman, 591 N.E.2d 1175 (N.Y.) (upholding summary contempt sanction imposed
on prosecutor who disobeyed judge's order to leave the well area of her courtroom), cert.
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they may threaten to do so from time to time.6 That is, in part, be-
cause contempt is unavailable for much of the behavior of prosecutors
that is considered to be wrongful-particularly conduct occurring during
the course of investigation or otherwise occurring outside the court's
presence. Yet, even in cases where the contempt sanction would seem
clearly to be appropriate, such as cases in which prosecutors directly
defy a court order, courts have declined to invoke this sanction, un-
doubtedly because it is unduly harsh. 7
When the prosecutor's wrongdoing is considered to be inadvertent
or too insignificant to warrant a harsher response, the court can repri-
mand the prosecutor, either privately or publicly. 8 The impact of a
public reprimand on the record at trial or, more significantly, in a
published opinion, should not be underestimated. Prosecutors are jeal-
ous of their reputations, including their reputations for probity.69 At
the same time, however, there is a serious risk of unfairness in the
practice of sanctioning a prosecutor by criticizing him in a public opin-
ion. In many instances the prosecutor may not have been afforded an
opportunity to present evidence and arguments to demonstrate the pro-
priety of his conduct.70 Even when the prosecutor has had a fair op-
denied, 113 S. Ct. 180 (1992).
It is applied more frequently to defense attorneys. See, e.g., Giovanelli, 897 F.2d at
1228; United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cutler,
58 F.3d 825, 837-38 (2d Cir. 1995); People v. Simac, 641 N.E.2d 416 (Il1. 1994).
66. Woodley, 9 F.3d at 782 (noting availability of contempt sanction to redress prosecutori-
al misconduct); Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185.
67. Horn, 29 F.3d at 754, 770.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Be-
cause . . . there is no indication that the government acted in bad faith in failing to provide
the target warnings, or that it proffered an affirmative misrepresentation [to the grand jury
witness] regarding his target status, we limit ourselves to verbal admonitions.").
Unlike some state court disciplinary bodies, district judges do not appear to issue formal
reprimands outside the context of judicial opinions. However, the authority to criticize the con-
duct of litigants is implicit in the authority of a judge to issue rulings and publish opinions. It
is common practice for courts to avail themselves of this forum. See Fields, 592 F.2d at 638
(holding that admonishment is a less drastic alternative than dismissing indictment because of
wrongdoing by SEC lawyers). Errant prosecutors may be criticized either anonymously, see,
e.g., United States v. Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 1988), or by name, see, e.g., United
Stated v. Isgro, 751 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 974 F.2d 1091
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1581 (1993), appeal after remand, 43 F.3d 1480 (1994).
69. See Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that reprimanding a named pros-
ecutor in a published opinion may have a deterrent effect upon prosecutorial misconduct).
Apparently recognizing the concern of prosecutors for their professional reputations, fed-
eral courts have also, on occasion, gone out of their way in written opinions to acknowledge
that they are not suggesting that the Assistant United States Attorney acted wrongfully. See,
e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 730 F. Supp. 1272, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
70. This potential for unfairness is not limited to instances in which prosecutors are re-
proached, but exists in all cases involving ad hoc criticism of lawyers by district judges. See,
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portunity to defend his conduct before the district court, a public re-
buke may be unfair in that, unlike a case in which a contempt sanction
is imposed, the prosecutor will generally be unable to obtain review of
the district court's finding.
7
'
In most cases when the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct is
called into question, but no remedy for the alleged wrongdoing is
available to the defendant, district judges decline to act as disciplinari-
ans, but instead leave it to others to address the question.- When a
Department of Justice Guideline has allegedly been violated, most dis-
trict courts will rely exclusively on self-policing. As the Seventh Cir-
cuit has observed:
The Department of Justice may give such weight as it chooses to
its internal rules. In all but the most exceptional cases, he who
writes the rules may choose the sanctions for noncompliance....
An effort to foist on the Executive Branch a sanction it does not
wish could lead the Executive Branch to abandon [its] policy rath-
er than suffer unwarranted reversals. 73
When federal prosecutors appear to have violated professional standards
such as those incorporated by reference in local rules of the court,
district courts may rely equally on state or federal disciplinary bodies.
This is not to say that district courts simply ignore prosecutorial
misconduct. In some instances, courts themselves refer errant prosecu-
e.g., United States v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 927-28 (9th Cir.) (criticizing the district judge's
expulsion of the defense lawyer from ongoing proceedings in response to the defense lawyer's
objection), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1210 (1991).
71. See H. Richard Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The Court of Appeals Versus Scott Turow,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1901 (1988).
72. This is consistent with the general view of courts that it is not their role to oversee
the ethics of the lawyers who practice before them,,except insofar as the purportedly unethical
conduct affects the rights of the parties appearing before the court. See generally Amy R.
Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the
Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics, 473, 550-51 & n.293
(1995); Committee on Professional Responsibility, Suppressing Evidence Obtained in Violation
of DR 7-104: If Hammad is Right, Is the Civil Law Wrong?, 48 RECORD 431, 433 (1992).
73. United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 267 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Gillespie, 974
F.2d at 802 ("In a case such as this, even if we were at liberty to exercise our supervisory
powers, we would hesitate to do so, lest the government be reluctant to establish internal rules
designed to safeguard defendants in the first instance.").
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tors to the relevant disciplinary authorities.74 In the view of some
commentators, however, courts do so too infrequently.75
B. DISTRICT COURT DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEES
Some district courts have, by local rule, created grievance or
disciplinary committees to conduct hearings into allegations of unethical
conduct by attorneys practicing before federal courts in the district.76
The committees are typically comprised of former judges or lawyers
practicing in the district who have been appointed to serve by the
court.77 They generally conduct their investigations, hearings and de-
liberations in secret. As a consequence, except when a public sanction
is ultimately issued or when the committee's decision later becomes the
subject of a published opinion by a reviewing court, there may be no
public record that an inquiry was conducted. It is, therefore, impossible
to determine with certainty the extent to which district court grievance
committees are called upon to determine the propriety of a federal
prosecutor's conduct.
The public record suggests, however, that federal prosecutors are
rarely, if ever, referred to federal grievance committees." Indeed, fed-
74. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1984); Beckett, 706 F.2d at 522;
United States v. Kelly, 543 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Mass.), opinion modified by 550 F. Supp. 901
(D. Mass. 1982); cf Modica, 663 F.2d at 1173-74 (approving referrals to disciplinary authori-
ties in appropriate cases); John M. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of Ethics-Fear
and Learning in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95, 97 (1982); Steele, supra note
6, at 981; ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Judicial Response to Lawyer
Misconduct 1.12 (1984). ("Once a reviewing court has found a prosecutor's actions to be mis-
conduct in the form of a disciplinary rule violation, whether or not reversal or dismissal is
warranted, the court should report the conduct to the appropriate disciplinary authorities.").
Courts may also refer prosecutors to the Justice Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility. See, e.g., Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d at 311 (indicating intent to refer to the De-
partment of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility for investigation and possible disci-
pline future failures by federal prosecutors to provide "target warnings" to grand jury witnesses
in accordance with the Justice Department's internal guidelines). However, it is apparently rare
for courts to do so.
75. Rosen, supra note 6, at 735 & n.251.; Steele, supra note 6, at 981.
76. See R. U.S. DisT. CT. DIST. OF CONN., Loc. R. 3; GEN. R. U.S. DIsT. CTS. S. & E.
DIST. N.Y., R. 4.
77. See, e.g., Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 91 (describing and upholding the disciplinary process of
the federal grievance committee for the Eastern District of New York).
78. There are stunningly few reported decisions concerning the conduct of federal court
disciplinary committees. None of the reported decisions involve federal prosecutors. See
Mashburn, supra note 72, at 537 ("federal judges use the formal federal disciplinary or griev-
ance processes infrequently"). For a discussion of one of the few published Second Circuit
opinions reviewing a decision of a federal grievance committee, see Green, supra note 23, at
485-86.
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eral district judges who are concerned about possible wrongdoing by a
federal prosecutor seem to be more inclined to refer the prosecutor to a
state disciplinary committee than to a disciplinary committee of the
district court.79 There are various possible explanations for this. First,
federal courts have traditionally deferred to state licensing authorities to
oversee the professional conduct of lawyers. 0 Second, the district
court disciplinary mechanisms tend to be ad hoc and unfunded, whereas
the state court disciplinary mechanisms are professionally staffed and
funded by the state. Additionally, district court discipline adds to the
federal court's workload. For all these reasons, district courts would
tend to invoke the federal disciplinary processes only in exceptional
cases and would view the state processes as the ordinary mechanism
for dealing with wrongdoing by federal litigators, including federal
prosecutors."
C. OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In addition to discipline by the courts, federal prosecutors are
subject to discipline by the Department of Justice.82 Its Office of Pro-
fessional Responsibility (OPR) is entrusted with the task of investigat-
ing allegations of unethical conduct as well as criminal wrongdoing by
federal prosecutors.83 The OPR looks primarily to government employ-
ees, private citizens or private attorneys for referrals, although it occa-
sionally receives complaints from federal judges as well.84 Although
the OPR has exclusive authority to review allegations of some claims
79. See Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL
1647 (1993).
80. Matter of Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995).
81. That federal prosecutors need not be admitted to practice before the federal district
court may provide an additional reason for deferring to state disciplinary authorities.
82. Although United States Attorneys are appointed by the President and may be removed
only by the President, Assistant United States Attorneys are subject to removal by the Attorney
General. 28 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542(b) (1988). See. e.g., Kenna v. Department of Justice, 727 F.
Supp. 64 (D.N.H. 1989) (rejecting Assistant United States Attorney's argument that his dismiss-
al violated the First Amendment).
83. 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a(a) (1995). In the case of allegations that a former prosecutor vio-
lated the conflict-of-interest provisions established in 18 U.S.C. § 207, disciplinary proceedings
are provided for by 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-7a, which may result in a prohibition on appearances
before the Department of Justice. Id.
84. For example, in 1988, the Office of Professional Responsibility received 424 com-
plaints against Department of Justice employees. Of that number, nineteen were attributed to
"miscellaneous sources" that included not only judges, but also bar associations and anonymous
complainants. In comparison, more than 75% of the cases that year originated with complaints
from Department components and employees, private citizens or private attorneys. See OFFICE
OF PROF. REsP., 1988 ANN. REP. TO THE ATr'Y GEN. at 4.
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of unethical conduct,85 for the most part its authority overlaps with
that of other disciplinary bodies.86 One substantial limitation, however,
is that the OPR has authority only over present Department of Justice
employees. Thus, a federal prosecutor may avoid scrutiny by leaving
government employ. 7
Even under the best of circumstances, defense attorneys might
doubt the efficacy of internal disciplinary mechanisms to curb prosecu-
torial misconduct.88 One might reasonably anticipate, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that attorneys in the Office of Professional
Responsibility lack neutrality and detachment when judging the conduct
of fellow members of the Department of Justice, both because they
identify and sympathize with their colleagues and because they want
the Department to appear to be relatively free of wrongdoing.
Until recently, the OPR conducted its investigations, made find-
ings and imposed sanctions almost entirely in secret. 9 This compound-
ed the perception that most prosecutorial wrongdoing went unpun-
ished." Because the OPR did not publicize its determinations, even
within the Department of Justice itself, but limited itself to identifying
and privately sanctioning wrongdoers within the Department, the OPR
was also ineffective in guiding federal prosecutors as to the bounds of
appropriate conduct and deterring prosecutorial misconduct."
85. In August 1994, the Department of Justice promulgated a regulation exempting its
lawyers from some provisions of the professional codes. See Comm. With Represented Persons,
28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995). Section 77.12 explains that the regulation is designed to supersede DR
7-104(A)(I) of the Model Code, and equivalent rules of professional ethics that restrict lawyers
in making direct contact with individuals who are represented by counsel. Id. § 77.12.
86. A federal prosecutor would generally be subject to federal disciplinary sanctions for
violating standards of conduct that have been adopted by the district court either by local rule
or in ad hoc rulings. Insofar as those standards are consistent with the standards of the state
where the prosecutor is licensed, the prosecutor would also be subject to state disciplinary
sanctions.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 46 F.3d 674, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The Office of
Professional Responsibility's only obligation is to determine whether individuals ought to remain
in the Department of Justice. . . . So all of this criminal conduct that's been exposed that
personnel engaged in will never be prosecuted or even filly investigated.").
88. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), in which the government, in op-
posing the reversal of a criminal conviction as a remedy for misconduct in the prosecutor's
summation, relied in part on the availability of internal discipline. It advised the Court that in
1980, the OPR "investigated 28 complaints of unethical conduct and that one Assistant United
States Attorney resigned in the face of an investigation." Id. at 506. However, to criminal
defense lawyers and perhaps others, this statistic would hardly inspire confidence in the aggres-
siveness of the OPR's investigations.
89. Beck v. Department of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that
OPR files were unavailable under the Freedom of Information Act).
90. Greg Rushford, Watching the Watchdog, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at 19-20.
91. The OPR eschewed even such modest possibilities as issuing opinions describing the
ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW
In response to criticisms of the Office of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the Department, under Attorney General Janet Reno, has adopted
the policy of making the OPR's findings public in either of two cir-
cumstances: when misconduct has been found or when the lawyer un-
der investigation, presumably after being exonerated, requests that the
findings be released." However, this change of policy can be expected
to do little to improve the perception of the OPR's inadequacy. This is
true, in part, because no public findings will be issued in the over-
whelming majority of cases where prosecutors are exonerated, and in
part because in thd rare case where findings are released, the underly-
ing facts developed in the investigation will still be kept secret.
The first public report issued by the OPR,93 a report on the in-
vestigation of conduct alleged in United States v. Isgro,9 4 illustrates
the problem. The district court in Isgro dismissed an indictment based
on two related findings of prosecutorial misconduct:95 first, that the
prosecutor had deliberately failed to produce exculpatory material, con-
sisting of a transcript of the main government witness's sworn trial
testimony denying that he had ever engaged in criminal conduct with
the defendant;9" and, second, that the prosecutor had made active mis-
representations about this material. 7 On appeal, although finding that
it was improper to dismiss the indictment, the court of appeals agreed
that the prosecutor's misconduct "rose to an intolerable level."98 Not
only did the court of appeals publicly chastise the prosecutor by name
and indicate that the district court would be justified in pursuing other
alternative remedies, it also directed the Attorney General to consider
whether departmental discipline was appropriate.99
The Department's public report of its investigation in Isgro was
hardly calculated to dispel skepticism of its internal disciplinary pro-
cess. The report found that the prosecutor sincerely believed he was
prosecutor's misconduct and the sanction imposed, without naming the attorney, or issuing opin-
ions that simply described the ethical rule that was violated and how the OPR interpreted the
rule while keeping the prosecutor's identity secret.
92. Jim McGee, Justice Department Sets Changes on Discipline: Prosecutor's Conduct Had
Led to Complaints, VASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
93. OFFICE OF PROF. RESP., PUBLIC REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF MISCONDUCT ALLEGA-
TIONS IN United States v. lsgro (1994) [hereinafter ISGRO REPORT].
94. 751 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 974 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1581 (1993), appeal after remand, 43 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).
95. Isgro, 751 F. Supp. at 851.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Isgro, 974 F.2d at 1099.
99. Id.
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not obligated to produce the witness's exculpatory testimony because it
was publicly available, and that the law was sufficiently unclear on this
point to make his belief reasonable.' Further, the report credited the
prosecutor's representation that he had not intentionally misled the
district judge about the transcript.' Thus, the Department essentially
cleared the prosecutor of the wrongdoing found by the federal courts.
His only wrong, according to the report, was a lack of diligence in
preparing the case for trial."2 A more diligent prosecutor, the report
found, would have thoroughly reviewed the main witness's trial tes-
timony and recognized its significance.0 3 The sanction for this lapse
was a public reprimand that drew attention to the prosecutor's "out-
standing career with the Department."'0 4
From the Department's conclusory findings in the Isgro case, it
cannot possibly be gauged whether the Department was correct and the
federal courts in error about the nature and seriousness of the
prosecutor's wrongdoing. Read against the background of the federal
court opinions, however, the report might seem to be more of a white-
wash than a serious exercise in internal discipline. Moreover, the ab-
sence of public reports chastising other prosecutors for similar lapses of
diligence, which seem to recur within some prosecutors' offices,'
adds to the appearance that the report in Isgro was intended principally
to exonerate the prosecutor."6 Not surprisingly, therefore, the OPR
has retained its reputation as unduly protective and has continued to
draw criticism. 7
100. ISGRO REPORT, supra note 93, at 2.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 760-61 (1st Cir. 1991) (government's
negligence in meeting disclosure obligations fits a "pattern of practice" for which it had been
criticized in the past).
106. On the opposite side of the coin, government lawyers would undoubtedly perceive the
Isgro prosecutor to have been scapegoated. The Department found that the prosecutor's only
failing had been a lack of diligence-the failure to review an 800-page transcript of a
witness's prior testimony that resulted in the failure to identify and disclose a single passage
favorable to the accused. ISGRO REPORT, supra note 93, at 3. If one accepts this finding, a
.public admonition might seem exceedingly harsh, given that similar lapses routinely go unno-
ticed or unpunished, that the wrongdoing was not willful, and that a public sanction had never
previously been issued by the Department for this or any other wrongdoing.
107. See, e.g., Harvey Berkman, GAO: DOJ Ethics Probers Lax, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17,
1995, at A16, (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-OFFICE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY'S CASE HANDLING PROCEDURES (GAO/OSI 95-8) (Mar. 31,
1995)).
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D. STATE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES
Finally, federal prosecutors who engage in misconduct may be
sanctioned by state disciplinary authorities. As a general matter, the
state appellate courts, which have authority over the lawyers who are
admitted to practice in the state, have delegated to grievance or disci-
plinary committees the task of investigating, prosecuting and adjudging
claims of attorney wrongdoing.' A disciplinary committee's determi-
nations are then subject to judicial review.
Despite recent calls for increased accountability, most state disci-
plinary authorities continue to conduct their investigations and hearings
in secret, with no public record made of the filing of a complaint and,
in many instances, no public disclosure of the committee's ultimate
determination." 9 Many disciplinary committees make liberal use of
private sanctions when minor wrongdoing is found."0 Only when the
committee imposes either a public reprimand or a more serious sanc-
tion, such as suspension or disbarment, will the public learn of its
proceedings. As a consequence, it is impossible to know how often
federal prosecutors have come under investigation by state disciplinary
committees or even how often federal prosecutors have been sanctioned
for misconduct."'
The secrecy of disciplinary investigations and proceedings has
been both defended and challenged on various grounds. Whatever else
may be said, it is clear that the secrecy of disciplinary proceedings
makes the disciplinary process almost entirely ineffective in defining
and deterring prosecutorial misconduct. In cases where it is unclear
how the ethical rules apply to the prosecutor's alleged behavior, a
disciplinary body will have to make its own interpretation of the ethical
rules. If it determines that the alleged conduct is proper, no charges
will be brought. No one will ever know, however, how the disciplinary
body interpreted the relevant ethical rules or what justified its inter-
108. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 82-84 & n.33; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1983) (setting forth model procedures for lawyer
discipline).
109. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 107.
110. For a discussion of the imposition of private sanctions in New York, see Hal R.
Lieberman, Informal Discipline: Tool to Upgrade Ethics Part I: Admonitions, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
22, 1991, at 1.
111. The few well publicized cases involving state disciplinary efforts directed at federal
prosecutors in recent years have involved prosecutorial communications with represented parties.
United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re John Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478
(D.N.M. 1992); Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989).
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pretation. If it is determined that the prosecutor's alleged conduct
would be improper under the relevant rules, a hearing may be held
with regard to the allegations. Even assuming, however, that those
conducting the hearing reach a similar conclusion about the scope of
the ethical rules and determine as a factual matter that the prosecutor
behaved as alleged, the bar and the public are unlikely ever to learn of
that. In most instances where the reach of the ethical rules is unclear,
the appropriate sanction, if any, will be a private one. The private
sanction will have the effect of depriving future prosecutors of guid-
ance as to what the disciplinary committee believes to be improper
conduct. It will also ensure that the disciplinary process provides little
deterrence of subtle forms of prosecutorial misconduct."2
Without a doubt, the dearth of reported disciplinary proceedings
brought by state authorities against federal prosecutors reflects that not
only are they rarely reported, but such proceedings are also rarely initi-
ated. There are at least four reasons why this should be so.
First, state authorities never learn of most cases in which federal
prosecutorial misconduct is thought to have occurred. For the most
part, state authorities initiate investigations based on complaints from
disgruntled clients, rather than from opposing counsel or judges. Prose-
cutors do not have a corporeal client to report their alleged wrongdo-
ing. Neither defense lawyers nor federal judges are diligent about re-
porting such allegations; reports from fellow prosecutors are undoubted-
ly rarer still. Pro-active disciplinary counsel may initiate investigations
based on criticisms leveled at federal prosecutors in judicial opinions,
but such opinions are written in only a fraction of the cases in which a
district judge, opposing lawyer, or fellow prosecutor suspects that pros-
ecutorial misconduct has occurred.
Second, state disciplinary authorities generally seek to reserve
resources for cases of the most egregious wrongdoing. These are usual-
ly cases where lawyers harm individual clients, mishandle client funds
or commit crimes. "' Few cases of prosecutorial misconduct fit these
112. An exceptional case was Kelly, 550 F. Supp. at 901, in which the federal district
court published a report of the state disciplinary board that found that the Assistant United
States Attorney had not deliberately violated the disciplinary rules. The court's decision to
publish the report came at the request of the United States Attorney's Office. Id. at 902. That
request might not have been made if the district judge had not previously published an opinion
referring the federal prosecutor's conduct to the state disciplinary board. Id. Although the Unit-
ed States Attorney asked that the report be published to give guidance to future prosecutors, it
is not unlikely that he also sought to establish a public record of the Assistant's vindication.
113. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 34 (1991).
1995]
ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW
categories." 4 The types of misconduct state or federal prosecutors are
typically accused of committing would not ordinarily give rise to disci-
plinary action when committed by civil lawyers."5 For example, dis-
covery violations by civil litigators are typically redressed by courts
through the imposition of judicial sanctions, not personal discipline."6
Although the need for public confidence in the integrity of criminal
prosecutions may argue for more aggressive enforcement against prose-
cutors, state authorities may be reluctant to adopt what would appear to
be a double standard. Indeed, aggressive enforcement of prosecutorial
standards might appear especially unfair given a historic perception that
criminal defense lawyers are among the least ethical practitioners. Thus,
even when state authorities learn of accusations of prosecutorial wrong-
doing, they are likely to decline to investigate as a matter of discretion.
Third, many state disciplinary bodies may have an ongoing rela-
tionship with federal and state prosecutors' offices. Disciplinary bodies
may both refer cases for criminal prosecution and obtain evidence from
prosecutors' offices for use in disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary
counsel would think twice about jeopardizing this relationship by pro-
ceeding aggressively against individual prosecutors.
Finally, state disciplinary authorities may be reluctant to proceed
against federal prosecutors in particular for at least two reasons. First,
they recognize that the Department of Justice is likely to bring its
extraordinary resources to bear in defense of the prosecutor. Thus, a
disciplinary proceeding will be unusually costly and time-consuming.
Second, the state agency's authority to discipline a federal prosecutor
may raise a difficult constitutional question under the Supremacy
Clause.' It is generally, although not universally, accepted that state
disciplinary agencies may sanction state prosecutors for professional
114. Id.
115. See id. at 11.
116. Id. at 36.
117. Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and State Prosecutors: The
Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 354-57,
369-84 (1992). Likewise, federal courts' authority to discipline federal prosecutors may raise
questions about separation of powers and about the scope of the federal courts' supervisory
powers. Id. at 384-86. See also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of
Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 490-91, 503 (1979).
[Vol. 8
POLICING FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
misconduct." 8 It is far less certain, however, that they may sanction
federal prosecutors.' 9
For all these reasons, except in the most extraordinary circum-
stances, state disciplinary agencies would be reluctant to seek sanctions
against federal prosecutors for conduct occurring in the context of
criminal proceedings. State disciplinary proceedings might be brought if
a case were referred by the Department of Justice itself, or if a formal
finding of serious wrongdoing was already entered in a federal court
proceeding. Proceedings might also be brought in response to a referral
by a federal court. Otherwise, for understandable institutional reasons
wholly apart from the sympathies or inexperience of those who oversee
them, state disciplinary bodies can be expected to turn their attention
elsewhere.
IV. THE INTERACTION OF DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES
A. THE IMPACT OF DIFFUSE REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY
There is a further explanation for the inadequacy of the formal
processes by which standards of prosecutorial conduct are enforced.
The lack of enforcement may be traced in part to the diffusion of
regulatory authority. Standards of prosecutorial conduct are
underenforced precisely because each of the various disciplinary author-
ities can justify relying on others to carry the load.'
State disciplinary committees take the view that the district court
is most familiar with the relevant circumstances surrounding the
118. Price v. State Bar of California, 638 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Cal. 1982); Massameno v.
Statewide Grievance Comm., No. CV-92-070-35-64, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3481, at *8
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 1993); Florida Bar v. Schaul, 618 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. 1993); In
re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1344-45 (I1. 1979); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 838
(Mo.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1009 (1991); In re Weishoff, 382 A.2d 632, 633 (N.J. 1978); In re Conduct
of Burrows, 629 P.2d 820, 823-25 (Or. 1981); Reed v. Virginia State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 544,
547 (Va. 1987); In re Mauch, 319 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Wis. 1982). But see Simpson v. Ala-
bama State Bar, 311 So. 2d 307, 310 (Ala. 1975) (holding that the Alabama Bar Association
lacked jurisdiction to discipline or disbar a district attorney under the state's Rules Governing
the Conduct of Attorneys).
119. In John Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 480-81, the court held that federal prosecutors may be
sanctioned by state disciplinary boards. However, the Department of Justice can be expected to
continue to question the authority of state disciplinary bodies.
120. In theory, the availability of diverse enforcement mechanisms should promote compli-
ance with ethical norms, but this presupposes that enforcement authorities coordinate their ef-
forts. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1992). In the absence of coordination, diverse enforcement mechanisms may prove not
only unproductive, but counterproductive. Supervision of federal prosecutors is a case in point.
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prosecutor's conduct and is therefore in the best position to determine
whether the prosecutor acted improperly. These committees may read
the district court's silence as a determination that the prosecutor's con-
duct was acceptable and, understandably, hesitate to take a contrary
view. Even when the court's silence is not read as an endorsement of
the prosecutor's conduct, a state disciplinary body would have good
reason to turn its attention elsewhere. Given how overworked state
disciplinary committees tend to be and the amount of serious attorney
misconduct they must address, they might reasonably regard it as an
inappropriate allocation of resources to investigate and prosecute prose-
cutorial conduct that was considered unremarkable by the court before
which the prosecutor appeared. 2'
Similarly, except in an unusual case such as Isgro, where a feder-
al court specifically finds prosecutorial misconduct and refers the case
for internal discipline, 2 1 the Office of Professional Responsibility may
never learn of a prosecutor's questionable conduct and, even when it
does, may have little incentive to pursue an investigation seriously.
Like a state disciplinary committee, the OPR may consider the district
court to be best situated to evaluate the prosecutor's behavior and may
view the district court's silence as an expression of unconcern. More-
over, the OPR must be sensitive to the concern that zealously investi-
gating prosecutors whose conduct seems to pass muster with the district
court would undermine the morale of Assistant United States Attorneys,
many of whom already consider themselves to be under siege by de-
fense lawyers, the organized bar, and, occasionally, federal judges.
Thus, the report issued in the Isgro case suggests that the OPR consid-
ers its function of vindicating wrongfully accused prosecutors as more
important than investigating prosecutors who have escaped judicial
criticism.
121. Consider Cramton & Udell, supra note 117, at 304-05 (asserting that "Disciplinary au-
thorities are accustomed to leaving most issues of lawyer conduct to other remedial settings.
Where a malpractice action or a sanction during the course of judicial proceedings is available,
a disciplinary committee is unlikely to take action.").
That disciplinary committees are reluctant to inquire into the propriety of conduct of
which a trial court was aware, in the absence of a referral by that court, is suggested by the
infrequency with which prosecutors are publicly disciplined, even when the impropriety of their
conduct is commented on by the trial court. It is also suggested by the infrequency with which
civil litigators and criminal defense lawyers are publicly sanctioned. There is, for example, a
substantial body of reported decisions-and, no doubt, an even more substantial body of unre-
ported decisions-that find that the attorney for an individual litigant had a conflict of interest.
Yet, there are few publicly reported cases in which lawyers have been sanctioned by a disci-
plinary body for having a conflict of interest at trial.
122. Isgro, 974 F.2d at 1099; see supra text accompanying note 99.
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Federal district courts, on the other hand, regard prosecutorial
misconduct as a problem to be addressed primarily by state disciplinary
committees, if not by self-policing.' The courts apparently assume
that state disciplinary authorities have jurisdiction to discipline federal
prosecutors-an assumption that the Department of Justice does not
necessarily share. One irony of the federal courts' deference to state
disciplinary authorities is that, in the event that a state authority does
proceed against a federal prosecutor, the prosecutor may be entitled to
remove the case to federal court. 4 Thus, reliance on state authorities,
while substantially reducing the likelihood that a disciplinary proceeding
will be initiated against a federal prosecutor, does not eliminate the
federal court's involvement on the rare occasion that a proceeding is
initiated.
B. THE NEED FOR COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION
What is needed to ensure that fewer cases of misconduct by fed-
eral prosecutors fall through the cracks? To begin with, district courts,
state disciplinary authorities and the Office of Professional Conduct
should communicate openly about the question of regulating federal
prosecutors. They should work to achieve some protocol concerning the
enforcement of standards of prosecutorial conduct in federal cases, so
that each knows what to expect of the other and serious allegations of
prosecutorial wrongdoing are pursued by at least one appropriate au-
thority.
Further, an agreement should be reached on which standards of
prosecutorial conduct are more appropriately enforced by one disciplin-
ary body rather than another. For example, the Justice Department's
Office of Professional Responsibility might take principal, if not exclu-
sive, responsibility for enforcing the Department's internal guidelines on
the theory that, as rule-maker, the Department is best equipped both to
interpret these guidelines and to assess appropriate sanctions for non-
compliance." 5 For essentially the same reasons, the federal courts
might take principal responsibility for enforcing both their ad hoc judi-
cial standards and specific local rules that augment the professional
codes. State disciplinary agencies might reasonably conclude that their
123. United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting the
authority of the United States Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility to
take appropriate action should a prosecutor fail to discharge the government's obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence).
124. Kolibash, 872 F.2d at 572.
125. See supra notes 37-50, 72-73 and accompanying text.
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principal role is to enforce the state's professional code, to the extent
that it applies to prosecutors in federal proceedings, and not these other
bodies of law.
Insofar as different disciplinary bodies share responsibility to en-
force particular standards of prosecutorial conduct, some understanding
should be reached about the role each will play. For example, district
courts should assume the initial role in the regulation of federal prose-
cutors; it is unlikely that any body will look seriously at the
prosecutor's conduct unless the district court asks it to do so. Thus, in
cases where genuine concerns are raised, a district court should either
initiate an inquiry itself or refer the case to another appropriate body.
At the same time, other disciplinary bodies should understand that
district judges look to them to carry the laboring oar in enforcing many
of the professional standards for federal prosecutors. These disciplinary
bodies should either accept that responsibility or give notice that they
are unwilling to do so. Thus, when a district court makes a referral to
a state disciplinary committee or to the Office of Professional Respon-
sibility, the relevant disciplinary agency should undertake a serious
investigation, as the district court contemplates it will, or let the district
court know that it is unwilling to do so for discretionary reasons unre-
lated to the merits of the case. The district court can then decide
whether to undertake its own investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
There are certainly enough authorities-federal and state, external
and internal-overseeing federal prosecutors. Yet, commentators have
uniformly lamented the lack of effective discipline of prosecutors who
violate standards of professional conduct. The infrequency with which
federal prosecutors are sanctioned personally for unethical conduct may
be attributed in part to inadequacies in each of the available disciplin-
ary mechanisms. Unless a defendant's rights are at issue, a district
court will be reluctant to interrupt a pending criminal proceeding and
to expend limited resources to adjudicate the propriety of a prosecutor's
conduct, particularly given the awareness that the available sanctions
are likely to appear either unduly lenient, as in the case of public criti-
cism, or too harsh, as in the case of a contempt sanction. Nor would
the court be likely to refer alleged misconduct to the district court's
grievance or disciplinary committee, since district court disciplinary
proceedings, where available, are typically reserved for exceptional
cases. State disciplinary authorities learn about proportionally few cases
in which federal prosecutors are accused of wrongdoing and, given
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their limited resources, they are reluctant to exercise discretion to pur-
sue seriously those few cases. And, while the Justice Department's
Office of Professional Responsibility does have adequate resources to
investigate such allegations, it has an apparent history of inadequate
enforcement.
An additional explanation for the failure of professional discipline
is the diffusion of responsibility among the various authorities who
oversee federal prosecutors. This is a problem that can and should be
addressed by all players in the disciplinary process: federal judges, state
disciplinary bodies, and the Department of Justice. Collectively, these
authorities should strive to craft a disciplinary process that is, in the
aggregate, more effective than each of the component parts.

